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ABSTRACT 
 USF completed a research study in 2005, which prioritized the replacement of 85 
deteriorating composite precast deck panel bridges. This thesis re-evaluates the original 
recommendations in the wake of failures of two of these bridges in 2007. Since funding 
will not allow all identified bridges to be replaced, it was necessary to determine the most 
effective repair methods. To assess USF’s recommendations, a forensic study was 
undertaken in which the most current inspection and work program documents on the two 
failed bridges were reviewed and FDOT personnel interviewed. The best repair 
procedures were determined by reviewing repair plans, specifications, reports and site 
visits. The study found the two bridges that failed had been correctly prioritized by USF 
(No. 1 of 18 and No. 8 of 15). A new, accelerated repair method encompassing complete 
bay replacement was developed in a pilot project funded by the Florida Department of 
Transportation. 
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1.   INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
The use of composite precast deck panel slabs on bridges was initially 
implemented in the construction of highway bridges in Illinois in the early 1950’s. This 
innovation was never part of the bridge design process but rather the result of value 
engineering during the construction phase. The precast deck panel was used as a stay-in-
place form and a cast-in-place (CIP) component was placed on top and in between the 
panels as shown in Figure 1.1, which considerably reduced construction time. By 
implementing this method, field forming was only needed for the exterior girder 
overhangs.  
 
Figure 1.1    Composite Deck- Precast Deck Panel and CIP Concrete  
In the early to mid 2000s, Florida had approximately 200 precast deck panel 
bridges, with the majority of them, 127 being located in Districts 1 and 7; this is 
2 
 
including 18 on the Leroy Selmon Crosstown Expressway (Crosstown Expressway) of 
the Florida Department of Transportation (FDOT) (see Figure 1.2) [1]. Precast panel 
sizes vary with girder spacing but are typically 10 ft. x 10 ft. in plan and 3½ in. to 4 in. 
thick. In design, it is assumed that the panel acts compositely with the CIP reinforced 
concrete slab for resisting live loads as shown in Figures 1.3 and 1.4. 
 
Figure 1.2    Precast Deck Panel Inventory in 2000 
 
Figure 1.3    Precast Deck Panel with CIP Component 
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Figure 1.4    Precast Deck Panel Reinforcement Details 
Despite successful performance in other states and satisfactory performance in 
other FDOT districts, precast deck panel bridges have a long history of premature 
deterioration in Districts 1 and 7 that has resulted in excessive maintenance for the FDOT 
and impacts to the traveling public. Previous research has attributed this to contractors 
using flexible fiberboard bearing material supports to simplify construction [2].   
The FDOT Districts 1 and 7 Structures Maintenance Office (DSMO) has 
responded to numerous maintenance problems on precast deck panel bridges throughout 
the I-75 corridor in southwest Florida. Initially, the response was reactionary, geared 
towards emergency situations in which a localized failure of the bridge deck resulted in 
lane closures. Between 2000 and 2003, five failures occurred. Over time, the DSMO 
began a proactive approach to monitoring, early detection and repair to avoid disruptive 
emergency situations.  
The DSMO had established a method to systematically replace selected precast 
deck panel bridges on I-75 in both Districts 1 and 7 with full depth, CIP concrete decks. 
The short-term goal was to replace the decks on bridges with high average daily traffic 
(ADT) and the long-term plans were to replace the decks on all precast deck panel 
bridges in both districts. The FDOT had allocated $78 million in 2001 for a period of 10 
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years to replace deck panel bridges on I-75 running through Districts 1 and 7, and $65 
million in 2003 for the Crosstown Expressway Viaduct Bridges.  
In 2005 The University of South Florida (USF) completed a comprehensive study 
for FDOT. The objective of the study was to prevent any further failures by identifying 
and prioritizing deck replacement of high risk bridges in Districts 1 and 7.  
However, since finalization of the study, two subsequent sudden bridge deck 
failures have taken place.  Both failures occurred in 2007 within District 7: the first one 
on the Crosstown Expressway and the other on I-75. 
1.2 Objectives 
The purpose of this research is to (1) reassess the prioritizations assigned to the 
two bridges that experienced deck failures subsequent to the finalization of the 2005 USF 
Study, (2) to provide an update of current status of composite precast deck panel bridges 
in FDOT’s Districts 1 and 7, and (3) assess the effectiveness of repair methods used on 
this type of deck system. 
This was accomplished by participating in the emergency response teams for both 
subsequent failures, gathering information, such as bridge inspection reports, monthly 
(deck panel) inspection reports, special engineering reports, plans, funding reports, 5-
Year Work Program report and construction status reports from the FDOT as well as 
meeting with key FDOT, consultant and contractor personnel. 
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1.3 Thesis Organization 
This report is organized into seven chapters and two appendices that describe 
various components of the research. Chapter 2 presents a literature review on other 
studies that have been published on composite precast deck panel bridges. Chapter 3 
provides details of the deck failures that occurred in 2007. Chapter 4 assesses the recent 
failures in comparison to USF’s rankings. Chapter 5 gives an update on the current status 
of composite precast deck panel bridges Districts 1 and 7.  Chapter 6 assesses the 
effectiveness of the repair procedures used on composite deck panel bridges and the 
summary and conclusions are presented in Chapter 7. 
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2.   BACKGROUND 
2.1 Prior Research 
Research related to the deficiencies of composite precast deck panel bridges has 
been undertaken since as early as 1982. A brief description of the research in 
chronological order is as follows: 
2.2 University of Florida Study (1982) 
In 1982, The University of Florida Study by Callis, et al. [2] was performed as a 
result of the excessive deck cracking on the Peace River Bridge. It concluded that: 
 The decks in their present cracked condition are structurally adequate to carry 
normal traffic. In spite of the simple action of the decks, flexural stresses are 
not excessive. 
 The shear stresses in the Peace River Bridge are substantially higher than that 
of conventional bridge decks or panel bridges with positive bearing at the ends 
of panels. The increase in shear stress is brought about by the combination of 
the lack of bearing of or the end of the panels and the loss of bond on the end 
of the panels which is primarily due to creep of the panels under the action of 
the prestress. 
 The observed cracking on the top of the deck is probably primarily due to the 
volume changes brought about by the differential shrinkage between panels 
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and CIP component. However, temperature changes and live load stresses 
certainly increase the tensile stresses and the degree of cracking. 
 Adding extra transverse or longitudinal steel is not felt to be sufficient to 
ensure adequate fatigue life of panel bridges. 
 Removing the fiberboard and replacing it with a material providing positive 
bearing (mortar) would greatly increase the fatigue life expectancy of the 
Peace River Bridge. Whether this action is economically justifiable depends 
on further studies of the shear fatigue behavior of the bridge. 
 Future panel construction projects should include a detail that provides 
positive bearing for panels. Strand extensions may also be useful. 
2.3 University of Florida Study (1983) 
In 1983, The University of Florida study by Fagundo, et al. [3] was a follow up to 
the Peace River Bridge Study, with the objectives to evaluate the potential  for shear 
fatigue failure of existing panel bridges constructed using details that did not provide 
positive bearing under the ends of the panels and to compare the performance of 
composite precast deck panel bridges constructed using several support details against the 
performance of conventional reinforced concrete decks. The report concluded that: 
 Composite decks without positive bearing act as simply supported beams with 
maximum positive moment in the center and negative moment at the ends. 
 Replacing fiberboard with grout would reduce shear stresses at ends. 
 Panel decks with positive bearing should have a service life comparable to 
conventional decks. 
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2.4 University of Florida Study (1984) 
In 1984, the third report on this subject from The University of Florida was 
authored by Fagundo, et al. [4] with the objective of developing an immediate 
management plan that would allow FDOT to decide upon a reasonable, not necessarily 
optimum, program for grouting and repairing the bridge decks. The report concluded that:  
 Bridges in which reasonable bond is maintained between the ends of the 
panels and the CIP component concrete should not exhibit any significant 
longitudinal spalling. Thus many of the panel bridges should not exhibit any 
significant longitudinal spalling for a very long service life. 
 It is known that the major factors that cause the loss of bond on the end of 
panels are: poor end treatment of the panel such as sawing, lack of strand 
extensions, creep of the panels after the deck is poured, shrinkage of the deck, 
and live load stresses after the deck is placed. However, it is impossible to 
predict for any given bridge the probability of loss of bond and the associated 
spalling. 
 Bridges that exhibit longitudinal spalling can be repaired by the M1 procedure 
which includes grouting under the panel. Once the repaired these bridges 
should have normal service lives. 
 Panel bridges with reduced longitudinal steel, particularly those with longer 
panel pans (girder spacing) have the potential for transverse spalling. 
 Transverse spalls that occur can be repaired by the M2 procedure as modified 
in Chapter 4, and should restore the deck to the extent that it would give a 
long service life. 
9 
 
 Furthermore, the study recommended that: 
 No large scale grouting or repair of panel bridges that have not exhibited any 
significant spalling is recommended. This is based on the expectation that the 
majority of the panel bridges will not exhibit significant spalling during their 
service life. 
 If any M1 or M2 repairs are made in a bridge span, that span should be 
thoroughly surveyed for delamination by the chain procedure and all areas 
that are suspected of being damaged should be repaired. Also, bearing should 
be restored to all panels within that span. 
 If a damaged bridge contains multiple spans, than all spans should be 
thoroughly investigated for delaminating. If significant delaminations appear 
then serious consideration should be given to repairing all damaged areas on 
the bridge. Further, any span that is repaired by either M1 or M2 procedures 
should be grouted under all panels. This recommendation is based on the fact 
that construction costs and inconvenience to the traveling public would be 
greater if a bridge is repaired one span at a time rather than all spans 
simultaneously. 
 Data on bridges that are repaired should be carefully kept both with regards to 
physical variables and costs. Thus, after a few years an empirical prediction 
can be made of future costs.  
 Field testing as part of research already planned should be directed towards 
verification of the repair techniques under field conditions. Attention should 
be given to testing spans with varying amount of longitudinal reinforcement. 
10 
 
 The management plan for the panel bridges outlined in steps 1 through 5 
should be reasonably cost effective based on the present state of knowledge. 
To develop a truly optimum management plan a comprehensive research 
program extending over several years is required. 
 It suggested that the M1 and M2 repair methods be incorporated with the 
modification described in section 4.2. These modifications should improve the 
ductility, strength, and durability of the repaired area. 
2.5 University of South Florida Study (2005) 
In 2005, The University of South Florida performed a study by Sen, et al. [5] with 
the objective of examining the deterioration process that leads to sudden failures in 
composite precast deck panel bridges and in turn to develop a strategy to assist the FDOT 
in the prioritization for replacement of these bridges in Districts 1 and 7 to avoid such 
failures. This study is reviewed more thoroughly because one objective of the author’s 
research is to reassess the recommendations of the USF Study. 
The USF study analyzed five localized failures that occurred in composite precast 
deck panel bridges in Districts 1 and 7 between 2000 and 2003. Table 2.1 summarizes 
relevant information relating to these failures. As indicated in the table, all failures had 
some type of repair while some had a combination of repairs.   All the failures were 
narrowed down to only two cities within the two districts, Sarasota and Tampa. A survey 
was also conducted to determine the performance of deck panel bridges in other districts. 
No failures had occurred in Districts 2, 3, 5 and 6. District 4 reported failures in two 
bridges: Bridge No. 940126, carrying I-95 (Southbound) over the Florida Turnpike and 
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Bridge No. 940127, I-95 (Northbound) over the Florida Turnpike but no details were 
provided. 
All failures occurred in bridges where the deck was nominally 7 inches thick. No 
failures occurred in deck panel bridges with thicker slabs. The percentage of trucks in the 
ADT varied between 8 and 30%. 
Table 2.1   Localized Deck Failures 2000 to 2003 
 
  
Bridge 
No. 
District  Year Built 
Age at 
Failure 
(Years) 
NBI 
Rating 
Before 
Failure 
Days 
Since 
Last 
Insp. 
Rain 
7 
Days 
Prior 
to 
Fail 
(in.) 
ADT
Failure 
Size 
(In.) 
Loc. in 
Panel  Comment Bridge 
Location 
Failure 
Date  %Truck 
170146 
1  1981 
19 
6
90 
days  0 
34,000
18  x 24  Edge or 
Corner? 
Failure at 
asphalt 
patch 
within full 
depth 
spall 
repair 
Sarasota, 
I‐75 NB 
Over Bee 
Ridge Rd 
2/12/2000  (Sat)  10% 
170086 
1  1980 
20 
7
180 
days 
2 34,000
36  x 60  Corner 
Support 
Localized 
full depth 
CIP repair 
Sarasota, 
I‐75 NB 
Over 
Clark Rd 
11/27/2000  (Good)  0.68  9% 
170085 
1  1980 
20 
7
210 
days 
4 34,000
18  x 18  Corner 
Asphalt 
patch 
adjacent 
to M1 
repair 
Sarasota, 
I‐75 SB 
Over 
Clark Rd 
12/20/2000  (Good)  0.2  10% 
100332 
7  1980 
22 
5
2 
days 
2 23,000
48  x 30  Near 
corner 
Asphalt 
Patch 
Tampa, 
Cross‐
town 
Viaduct 
WB Span 
38 
10/2/2002  (Fair)  0.55  8% 
100332 
7  1980 
23 
5
23 
days 
3 23,000
24  x 36  Edge 
Failed M1 
repair 
with 
flexible 
patch 
material 
Tampa, 
Cross‐
town 
Viaduct 
WB Span 
70 
9/5/2003  (Fair)  1.1  8% 
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 All failures occurred under the wheel loads applied close to the face of the girders 
where initial longitudinal cracks developed.  Also in all five cases, the failure occurred in 
the right lane, (i.e. slow lane), where large and heavier loads (i.e. eighteen wheeler trucks 
and permit vehicles) generally travel. Failure was normally in the edge or corner panels 
whose boundaries developed reflective longitudinal and transverse cracking.  
 A deterioration model based on the field observations and analysis of localized 
failures was developed in the study (see Figure 2.1). However, as the structural behavior 
of composite precast deck panel bridges depends on several factors, not all of which can 
be quantified, it makes it almost impossible to accurately predict future service life using 
numerical analysis. On the other hand, inspection data that tracks progression of cracking 
can be more successful in predicting localized failure. 
 
Figure 2.1    Deterioration Model 
 The simplified model indicates that longitudinal cracks first develop along the 
girder lines. This is followed by occasional reflective transverse cracking. Such defects 
appear within 5 years of construction. These cracks may not change for nearly 10 years 
after which there is more widespread transverse cracking. Longitudinal and transverse 
Initial Condition
Longitudinal Crack Parallel Longitudinal
Crack (Shear)
First Spall Spall Increase/Spall Patching
New Spall/
Spall Increase M1 Repair
Parallel Longitudinal Cracking
Adjacent to M1 Repair
Walking Spalls
Adjacent to M1 Repair
M1 Cracking and
Adjacent Spall Increase
Adjacent
Spall Patch
Additional Adjacent
Spall Patching
Localized Deck
Failure
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cracking result in spalling and delamination that require repair. This is an important stage 
in the deterioration process because the type and quality of repair will dictate if the long-
term performance of the bridge is satisfactory or poor. In most cases, such damage occurs 
in regions where the panel is improperly supported on fiberboard bearing material. Where 
deck repairs are combined with proper panel bearing (e.g., by placing non-shrink grout or 
injecting epoxy), repairs are satisfactory. Where this is not carried out, and repairs are 
limited to surface repairs, there is progressive degradation as shown in Figure 2.1, which 
can lead to failure. In several instances, failures occurred at locations where temporary 
repairs had not been replaced.  
 Simplified calculations performed in the USF study proved that punching failures 
could result at loads below the design wheel load. This assumed the CIP deck to provide 
no resistance and the panel to be supported on fiberboard bearing material with well 
developed cracking along the transverse and longitudinal panel boundaries. The failure 
load was calculated to be around 15 kips. Otherwise, failure loads were nearly four times 
higher. 
Equipped with this information, the USF team created replacement prioritization 
for bridges in District 1, District 7 and the Crosstown Expressway, respectively (See 
Tables A.1-A.5). 
2.6 Summary and Conclusions 
Various studies have been conducted on the problems with composite precast 
deck panel bridges. One such study was completed by USF in 2005. It investigated the 
five failures occurring in Districts 1 and 7 between 2000 and 2003, with the goal of 
14 
 
prioritizing high risk bridges for replacement and consequently to eliminate sudden 
failures in the future.  
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3.   DECK FAILURES IN 2007 
3.1 Introduction 
The main objective of the USF Study was to prioritize high risk bridges for 
replacement and in turn eliminate further sudden failures. However, since finalization of 
the study in 2005, two subsequent failures have take place.  Both failures occurred in 
2007 and within District 7. Details of the subsequent failures are provided in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1   Localized Deck Failures Following USF Study 
 
   
Bridge 
No. 
District  Year Built 
Age at 
Failure 
(Years) 
NBI 
Rating 
Before 
Failure 
Days 
Since 
Last 
Insp. 
Rain 
7 
Days 
Prior 
to 
Fail 
(in.) 
ADT 
Failure 
Size 
(Inches) 
Loc. in 
Panel  Comment Bridge 
Location  Failure Date  %Trucks 
100332 
7  1980 
27 
5
565 
  0.21 
23,000
18  x 8  Edge 
Failed 
localized 
patch 
repair 
Tampa, 
Cross‐
town 
Viaduct 
WB Span 
39 
3/5/2007  (Fair)  8% 
100436 
7  1983 
24 
5
685  0.54 
46,250
12  x 24  Edge 
Failed 
localized 
patch 
repair 
I‐75 over 
E. 
Broadway 
Ave., CR 
574 and 
CSX 
Railroad 
9/11/2007  (Fair)  8% 
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3.2 Bridge No. 100332 
The first failure occurred on March 5, 2007, on Bridge No. 100332, The 
Crosstown Expressway (Westbound) Viaduct, Span 39, Lane 2 (see Figures 3.1 and 3.2),  
The failure size was approximately 18 in. x 8 in. hole through the deck and it occurred 
within the outside edges of a nearly 5 ft. x 7 ft. existing repair patch. It was located on the 
edge of the panel and the edge of the beam. 
      
 
Figure 3.1    Bridge No. 100332, Span 39 Failure (Deck Top)  
17 
 
     
 
Figure 3.2    Bridge No. 100332, Span 39 Failure (Deck Underside) 
Bridge No. 100332 is a 91 span (67 spans with precast deck panels) structure 
carrying the Crosstown Expressway westbound with two 12 ft. lanes and a 8 ft. wide 
right shoulder and 4 ft. wide left shoulder. The average daily traffic (ADT) in 2007 was 
23,000, with 8% truck traffic. The superstructure consists of AASHTO Type III 
prestressed concrete beams. The failure happened on Span 39, which is approximately 55 
ft. – 1½ in. long, and the beams are spaced at 8 ft. -1 ¼ in. supporting a typical 7 in. thick 
composite deck.  
The last biennial inspection report prior to the failure was finalized August 17, 
2005, 565 days before failure, and assigned the deck an NBI Rating of 5 (fair) [6]. The 
report makes general statements applying to all precast deck panel spans stating that the 
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deck top has light to moderate wear and is typically populated with minor cracks. Also 
that the deck top and deck undersides have minor multi-directional cracking in isolated 
locations and some of the deck top cracks have minor associated spalls. It noted that on 
some of the deck underside many cracks have light efflorescence. The report also 
indicated that there are minor delaminations in isolated locations up to 1.5 ft. x 3 in. 
along the construction joints.  
More specific details on deficiencies were acquired from the monthly deck panel 
inspection reports [7] indicating that longitudinal cracks were sealed in October 2006. 
Some new spalls developed at the edge of an existing repair in the south wheel path of 
Lane 2 in January 2007. The spalls increased to high priority in the February report 
indicating there is a 2 ft. x 2 ft. x 2 in. spall with delamination on the topside of the deck 
and another of the same size on the deck underside. These deficiencies progressed into a 
punch through failure occurring on March 5, 2007, consisting of an 18 in. x 8 in. hole, 
which had to be addressed with an emergency repair applying full depth bay replacement 
across two panels (see Figure 3.3) [8].  
The failure occurred after a heavy rainfall event [9].  The precipitation according 
to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) archives was 0.21 in. 
seven days prior to the failure. 
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Figure 3.3    Excerpts from Emergency Inspection Report 
3.3 Bridge No. 100436 
The next failure took place on September 11, 2007, on Br. 100436, I-75 
(Northbound) over E. Broadway Ave., CR 574 and CSX Railroad, in Span 4, Lane 3 (See 
Figures 3.4 and 3.5). The failure was approximately 12 in. x 24 in. and was located inside 
an existing repair patch, on the edge of the panel as indicated in the emergency inspection 
report in Figure 3.6 [10]. Like its predecessor, the failure was also located on the edge of 
the panel and the edge of the beam. 
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Figure 3.4    Bridge No. 100436, Span 4 Failure (Deck Top) 
 
Figure 3.5    Bridge No. 100436, Span 4 Failure (Deck Underside) 
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Figure 3.6    Excerpt from Emergency Inspection Report 
Bridge No. 100436 is a five span structure carrying I-75 Northbound with three 
12’ Lanes and 10’ shoulders on both, right and left sides, The average daily traffic (ADT) 
in 2007 was 46,250, with 8% truck traffic. The superstructure consists of AASHTO Type 
II, III and IV beams. The failure happened on Span 4, which is approximately 76 ft. in 
length and is comprised of Type III beams, spaced at 8 ft.-10 in., supporting a typical 7 
in. thick composite deck. 
The last biennial inspection report prior to the failure was finalized October 27, 
2005, 685 days before failure, which assigned the deck an NBI Rating of 5 (fair) [11]. 
The report documented that there are numerous patches made with “epoxy type” material 
in the deck top, longitudinal cracking with maximum widths of 1/16 in. over the edge of 
beam lines and transverse cracks up to 12 ft. long x 1/8 in. wide over the precast deck 
panel joints in all spans. It stated that most transverse cracks are spaced 8 ft. apart, which 
is the approximate length of a deck panel on this bridge. Due to the problem with 
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excessive cracking throughout the bridge, a deck cracking diagram was prepared for the 
inspection files as shown in Figure 3.7 [12]. 
 
Figure 3.7    Bridge No. 100436, Transverse Cracking Pattern 
The monthly inspection reports indicate that localized repairs were made in Span 
4 in April, July and September of 2005 and in February of 2007. The reports also indicate 
that there is a problem with transverse cracking throughout the bridge. Most of the 
cracking is 1/8 in. wide but three cracks in particular were identified with an approximate 
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width of ¼ in. [13]. The reports indicate that the three ¼ in. cracks have been present 
since August of 2006 as shown in Figure 3.8.  
 
Figure 3.8    Bridge No. 100436, Span 4 Failure (3/4 in. Transverse Crack) 
The precipitation was 0.54 in. seven days prior to the failure according to the 
NOAA archives. 
3.4 Summary and Conclusions 
The USF Study’s goal was to prioritize high risk bridges for replacement and in 
order to eliminate any additional sudden failures in the future. However, since 
finalization of the study in 2005, two bridges experienced sudden failures. The failures 
took place on Bridge No. 100332, Crosstown Expressway Viaduct, Span 39 and Bridge 
No. 100436, I-75 over E. Broadway Ave., CR 574 and CSX Railroad. Both failures 
occurred in 2007 and were located in District 7. Both failures were inside the limits of 
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existing repairs, were located on the edge of the precast panel, and edge of beam and 
occurred after rain events. 
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4.   ASSESSMENT OF USF PRIORITIZATION RELATIVE TO NEW FAILURES 
4.1 Bridge No. 100332 
The USF study had ranked this bridge as No. 1 for replacement on the Crosstown 
prioritization listing as shown in Table A.5.  First priority replacement ranking was given 
to this bridge because it ranked the highest in the categories of Failing Repair Count, 
Weighted Index, FDOT Ranking, ADT, Importance, Normalized, Risk and Safety as 
quantified below: 
 Year Built: 1975 
 Spall Count: 344.7 
 Failing Repair Count: 44.9 
 Weighted Index: 1018.7 
 FDOT Rank: 1 
 ADT: 23,000 
 Importance Rank: 1 
 Normalized Risk: 1.000 
 Risk Rank: 1 
 Safety Rank: 1 
However, despite being ranked with highest replacement priority on the 
Crosstown Expressway, the FDOT was unable to acquire all the funding required to 
replace the bridge decks in time to avoid the failure. It is because this bridge was 
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programmed for deck replacement along with its twin structure, Bridge No. 100333, 
Crosstown Expressway (Eastbound), which makes a total of 134 precast deck panel spans 
to be replaced. The large number of spans to be replaced required considerably more time 
to obtain funding than the typical three span bridges on I-75. Replacement funding in the 
amount of $65 million had been programmed in 2003 for this project [14]. This amount 
was approved for use in 2009 and the deck replacement project was advertised and four 
design build firms were shortlisted on March 12, 2010. However, it is currently on hold 
because The Tampa-Hillsborough Expressway Authority (THEA) requested that the 
bridges also be widened along with deck replacement [15]. Although widening was given 
as an option in FDOT’s request for proposal, the additional $65 million required for this 
work was not initially programmed. Consequently the project is at this time on hold and 
THEA is trying to obtain “stimulus funding” from the Federal Government to include the 
additional work. The FDOT is expecting to select a firm from the four shortlisted parties 
in early 2011 and begin work by midsummer. 
Taking all of this information into account, USF’s replacement prioritization for 
Bridge No. 100332 was very accurate. It was justified in being ranked No. 1. Had the 
FDOT been able to acquire the replacement funding for this bridge earlier, the failure 
might have been avoided. 
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4.2 Bridge No. 100436 
The USF Study had ranked this bridge as No. 8 for replacement. The following 
factors were taken into consideration for ranking: 
 Year Built: 1983 
 Spall Count: 5.5 
 Failing Repair Count: 1 
 Weighted Index: 17 
 USF Inspection Condition: Acceptable 
 FDOT Rank: 7 
 ADT: 44,500 
 Normalized Risk: 0.142 
 Safety Rank: 9 
 Importance Rank: 6 
 Risk Rank: 8 
The main reason why this bridge was not prioritized higher for replacement at the 
time of the study was because it only had one failing repair. The research team concluded 
that the very low count of failing repairs was a good indication that the bridge would not 
fail [16]. However, immediately after the study was finalized four repairs failed 
consecutively leading up to the date of deck failure as noted in the monthly inspection 
reports.  
The FDOT was not able to perform emergency repairs using the DSMO’s 
preferred method of full depth bay replacement with CIP concrete because, due to the high 
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ADT on I-75, the lanes could not be closed to traffic to allow the concrete to cure as 
required.  Instead, the DSMO instructed their asset maintenance contractor to temporarily 
fasten a ¾ in. thick steel plate with anchor bolts on the deck top over the failure as shown 
in Figure 4.1. Then timber bracing was installed in the bays underneath to prevent beams 
from torsion (see Figure 4.2). A few days later, the steel plate was removed and replaced 
with high strength, fast setting concrete repair material. This repair was performed within 
a few hours during a night time lane closure [17]. 
 
Figure 4.1    Bridge No. 100436, Span 4 Failure (Temporary Steel Plate) 
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Figure 4.2    Bridge No. 100436, Span 4 Failure (Timber Bracing) 
Approximately eleven months after the failure, on August 19, 2009, DSMO’s 
monthly inspection of deck panel bridges cited significant deflection and deterioration in 
the repair patch material (see Figure 4.3).  Asset maintenance personnel were summoned 
onsite, and it was agreed by all parties that an immediate repair was required. The lane 
once again had to be temporarily closed to traffic for a few hours. The deteriorated patch 
was removed and replaced with sound material and additional timber bracing was 
installed in both north and south directions of the existing shoring between the beams 
[18]. 
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Figure 4.3    Bridge No. 100436, Span 4 (Failure in Patch Repair Material) 
USF had ranked Bridge No. 100436 No. 8 out of 15 in priority for replacement. 
The main reason for not ranking this bridge higher provided by the USF research team 
was because it had only one failing spall repair. However, it is evident that six of the 
seven bridges ranked for replacement ahead of this bridge had no failing repairs. The 
same six also had a lower Weighted Index. Six bridges ranked lesser in priority in FDOT 
Rank, Safety Rank, Normalized Risk, Safety Rank, Importance Rank and had and lower 
ADTs.  
According to the Cracking Diagram in Figure 3.7, the transverse cracking pattern 
appears to be consistent with spacing of the precast panels.  Apparently lack of 
longitudinal continuity between precast deck panels resulted in the transverse cracks 
propagating in the “component” or CIP concrete portion. These cracks prevent the deck 
system from behaving compositely resulting in reduced punching shear capacity as 
supported by the punching shear calculations performed in the USF Study. If the precast 
panel support is poor due to the fiberboard bearing material, then the punching shear is 
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resisted by only two sides.  In this case, depending on factors like overload and material 
properties, the punching shear failure of the panel becomes possible.   
Considering that ranking categories of Bridge No. 100436 were higher in priority 
than the six other bridges ranked before it and discovering that this bridge had a prevalent 
problem with transverse cracking, it is determined that it would probably have been more 
accurate to rank this bridge at replacement priority No. 2, before the other six bridges. 
However, since Bridge No. 100436 was on the replacement prioritization list and ranked 
approximately midway between the 15 bridges on that list, it is the author’s judgment that 
USF’s ranking was on target.  
4.3 Summary and Conclusions 
The USF prioritization for replacement of Bridge No. 100332 was accurate and 
totally justified in being ranked No. 1. 
The prioritization of Bridge No. 100436 was also on target. It was on the 
replacement prioritization list and ranked No. 8, approximately midway between the 15 
bridges on that list. 
The USF Study replacement rankings for both bridges that subsequently failed in 
2007, Bridge Nos.  100332 and 100436 were justifiable.  
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5.   PRESENT STATUS OF PRECAST DECK PANEL BRIDGE REPLACEMENT 
5.1 Status 
Utilizing the $78 million acquired in 2001along with implementing strategies 
such as including deck replacement within interstate widening projects, FDOT has been 
working vigorously on replacing the existing composite precast deck panel systems on 
bridges in Districts 1 and 7 with CIP concrete decks.  At this point, the decks of 51 
bridges in both districts combined have been replaced with CIP concrete decks. The 
majority of the funding by far was consumed in District 1 [19]. The breakdown is as 
follows: 
 District 1- bridges carrying or over I-75: 36 
 District 7- bridges carrying I-75: 9 
 Crosstown Expressway Bridges: 6 
The FDOT has shortlisted four design build firms for deck panel replacement on 
Crosstown viaduct bridges. The contract is pending final selection and execution, which 
is expected to happen sometime in early 2011 and work should begin before the end of 
the year. However, due to the limited availability of funding and the current condition of 
the state’s economy, the remaining deck panel bridges in both, Districts 1 and 7, will 
have to be addressed with repairs until additional funding, if any, can be acquired for 
complete deck replacement. Currently three precast deck panel bridges that were on 
District 7’s Work Program since 2000, Bridge Nos. 100468, 100469 and 100470, were 
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moved from the district’s planning category of “deck replacement” to “deck repairs.”  In 
addition, two more precast deck panel bridges, Bridge Nos.100358, 100359, have been 
added to the work program for deck repair as well [20].  Along with the lack of funding, 
deck replacement on high ADT highways such as I -75 is no longer feasible due to the 
volume of traffic backup that is created as a result of closing lanes. District 7’s lane 
closure policy justifies closing lanes based on traffic counts. If the traffic count is too 
high as the case on I-75, the district will not allow any lane closures for planned projects. 
For this reason it is imperative to research the repair and rehabilitation methods to 
address precast deck panel bridge deficiencies and determine the effectiveness of each 
application. 
The USF Study recommended replacement prioritization tables for District 1, 
District 7 and the Crosstown Expressway. Replacement rankings were provided for 
bridges that needed replacement as well as for bridges in good condition. As part of this 
research, the tables have been updated with current information regarding NBI condition 
rating and replacement status.  
Table 5.1    Recommended District 1 Bridge Replacement Sequence 
No. Bridge ID # Location 
Current Condition NBI 
Rating Replaced
1 130090 I-275 NB Over I-75 N.A. Yes 
2 130112 I-275 SB R to I-75 NB & 
 I-75 And I-275 Ramps 
5 (Fair) No- 
removed 
from 
program 
3 170081 I-75 Over Palmer Blvd N.A. Yes 
4 170080 I-75 Over Main  A  Canal N.A. Yes 
5 030188 I-75 over CR-846 Information unavailable N.A. 
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Table 5.1 (Continued) 
6 170094 I-75 NB Over Havana Road N.A. Yes 
7 170099 SR-681 SB Over CSX RR 6 (Satisfactory) No  
8 170089 I-75 Over River Road/Cr 777 N.A. Yes 
9 170100 SR-681 NB Over CSX RR 7 (Good) No 
10 010064 Oil Well Road Over I-75 6 (Satisfactory) No 
11 030187 I-75 Over CR-846 Information 
unavailable 
N.A. 
12 170096 I-75 SB Over Jacaranda Blvd N.A. Yes 
13 170079 I-75 Over Main A Canal N.A. Yes 
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Table 5.2    District 1 Bridges in Good Condition 
No. Bridge ID# Location 
Current 
Condition NBI 
Rating 
Replaced 
1 10059 I-75 Over CR-776 N.A. Yes 
2 10065 Airport Rd Over I-75 7 (Good) No 
3 10066 CR-768 Over I-75 7 (Good) No 
4 10067 US-17 Over Florida St. 6 (Satisfactory) No 
5 10068 US-17 Over Florida St. 6 (Satisfactory) No 
6 10075 Carmalite St. Over I-75 6 (Satisfactory) No 
7 10090 US-17 Over Lavilla St. & Rr 6 (Satisfactory) No 
8 10091 US-17 Over Lavilla St. & Rr 6 (Satisfactory) No 
9 120085 US-41 Over Imperial River 7 (Good) No 
10 120086 US-41 Over Imperial River 
Information 
unavailable 
N.A. 
11 120088 SR-685 Over Matanzas Pass 6 (Satisfactory) No 
12 120114 Slater Rd. Over I-75 
6 (Satisfactory) No- moved 
out to 2020 
13 120126 I-75 NB Over Alico Rd./Canal
Information 
unavailable 
N.A. 
14 120127 I-75 SB Over Alico Rd./Canal 
Information 
unavailable 
N.A. 
15 130085 I-75 NB Over SR-64 N.A. Yes 
16 130089 Erie Rd Over I-75 6 (Satisfactory) No 
17 130107 Mendoza Rd Over I-75 7 (Good) No 
18 170082 I-75 Over Palmer Blvd. N.A. Yes 
19 170083 I-75 SB Over SR-780 7 (Good) No 
20 170084 I-75 NB Over SR-780 7 (Good) No 
21 170090 I-75 Over River Rd. N.A. Yes 
22 170091 I-75 SB Over Jackson Rd. N.A. Yes 
23 170092 I-75 NB Over Jackson Rd. N.A. Yes 
24 170093 I-75 Over SR-80 N.A. Yes 
25 170095 I-75 NB Over Jacaranda Blvd. N.A. Yes 
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Table 5.3    Recommended District 7 Bridge Replacement Sequence 
No. Bridge ID# Location 
Current NBI 
Rating Replaced
1 100468 I-75 SB Over Woodberry Rd. 6 (Satisfactory) No 
2 100347 I-75 NB Over SR-674 N.A. Yes 
3 100470 I-75 SB Over CSX RR 6 (Satisfactory) No 
4 100358 I-75 SB Over Alafia River 5 (Fair) No 
5 100359 I-75 NB Over Alafia River 5 (Fair) No 
6 150122 I-275 NB Over 5th Ave. North 7 (Good) No 
7 100346 I-75 SB Over SR-674 N.A. Yes 
8 100436 
I-75 NB Over Broadway/CR-574 
/ CSX RR 
5 (Fair) No 
9 100338 US-41 Over Mackay Bay 5 (Fair) No 
10 100357 I-75 NB Over Riverview Drive 5 (Fair) No 
11 100356 I-75 SB Over Riverview Drive 5 (Fair) No 
12 100080 SR 60 WB Over Bypass Canal 5 (Fair) No 
13 100081 SR 60 EB Over Bypass Canal 5 (Fair) No 
14 100049 US-41Over Palm River 7 (Good) No 
15 100351 Valroy Road Over I-75 5 (Fair) No 
 
Table 5.4    District 7 Bridges in Good Condition 
No. 
Bridge 
ID# Location 
Current NBI 
Rating 
Replaced 
1 100398 
 I-75 NB Over Sligh Ave./Ramp 
D-1 
7 (Good) No 
2 100339  US 301 Over Bypass Canal 6 (Satisfactory) No 
3 100377  Gibsonton Dr. Over I-75 5 (Fair) No 
4 100399 SR 582 WB Over Bypass Canal 6 (Satisfactory) No 
5 100424  Ramp B Over US 92 7 (Good) No 
6 100435 
 I-75 SB Over 
Broadway/CR574/CSX RR 
6 (Satisfactory) No 
7 100469  I-75 NB Over Woodberry Rd. 6 (Satisfactory) No 
8 100471  I-75 Over CSX RR 6 (Satisfactory) No 
9 150121 I-275 SB Over 5th Ave 7 (Good) No 
10 150145  I-375 WB Over CR-689 7 (Good) No 
11 150146  I-375 EB Over CR-689 7 (Good) No 
12 150168  I-175 WB Over 6th St. S 7 (Good) No 
13 150169  I-175 EB Over 6th St. S 7 (Good) No 
14 150170  8th St. S. Over I-175 5 (Fair) No 
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Table 5.5   Recommended Crosstown Expressway Replacement Sequence 
 
 
No. Bridge ID # Location 
Current 
Condition 
NBI Rating 
Replaced 
1 100332 
SR 618 WB Over  Hills River/ 
Downtown TPA 
5 (Fair) Scheduled 
in 2011 
2 100333 
SR 618 EB Over  Hills River/ 
Downtown TPA 
6 
(Satisfactory) 
Scheduled 
in 2011 
3 100443 
SR618 Over  Ramp D & SR585/22nd 
Street & R/R 
4 (Poor) 
Structurally 
Deficient 
No 
4 100453 SR 618  Over 50th Street (US 41) N.A. Yes 
5 100448 SR 618 Over CSX  RR 
Removed to 
accommodate 
new elevated 
bridge. 
N.A. 
6 100451 SR 618 Over 39th Street 
6 
(Satisfactory) 
No 
7 100447 SR 618  Over RR 7 (Good) No 
8 100457 SR 618  Over Maydell Drive N.A. Yes 
9 100449 SR 618 Over 34th Street & Creek 
6 
(Satisfactory) 
No 
10 100454 SR 618 Over 50th Street (US 41) N.A. Yes 
11 100456 SR 618 Over CSX R/R N.A. Yes 
12 100444 
SR 618 Over SR 585 22nd St/CSX 
RR 
6 
(Satisfactory) 
No 
13 100455 SR 618 Over CSX RR N.A. Yes 
14 100450 SR 618 Over 34th Street & Creek 
Replaced to 
accommodate 
new elevated 
bridge. 
N.A. 
15 100452 SR 618 Over 39th Street 
Removed to 
accommodate 
new elevated 
bridge. 
N.A. 
16 100446 SR 618 Over 26th Street 
6 
(Satisfactory) 
No 
17 100458 SR 618 Over Maydell Drive N.A. Yes 
18 100445 SR 618 Over 26th Street 
6 
(Satisfactory) 
No 
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5.2 Summary and Conclusions 
At this point, the decks of 51 bridges in both districts combined have been 
replaced with CIP concrete decks. The majority of the funding was consumed in District 
1, followed by District 7, then the Crosstown Expressway. However due to budget 
restrictions, aside from three bridges on the work program for replacement, the remaining 
composite precast deck panel bridges  will have to be addressed with rehabilitation. 
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6.   BRIDGE DECK REPAIR METHODS 
6.1 Introduction 
As stated in the previous chapter, because of the difficulty in acquiring funding 
due to the sluggish condition of the state and national economy at this time, the remaining 
deck panel bridges in both, Districts 1 and 7, will have to be addressed with rehabilitation 
rather than replacement as originally planned. 
6.2 Repair Materials  
Repair material and method of construction can make the difference between a 
good and poor repair. Therefore, prior to proceeding with the repair procedures it is 
crucial to discuss some relevant issues regarding repair materials. Repair material 
selection is not an easy task because there are too many material manufacturing 
companies and even more so of products to select from. The information provided by the 
manufacturers and distributors is incomplete or in worse cases misleading. Additionally, 
new materials as well as new repair methods are constantly introduced and changes are 
frequently being applied to tried and true products.  
A good source for guidance on selecting a repair material is The American 
Concrete Institute’s 546.3R-06, Guide for the Selection of Materials for the Repair of 
Concrete [21]. This publication was written with the goal to provide guidance on 
common repair material, emphasize relevant repair material properties, test procedures, 
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minimum performance levels and applications for requirements and service 
environments. 
The first step of the process is to perform an in-depth inspection of the problem in 
the field and to document the deficiencies, potential damage and damage cause. This is 
followed by an assessment of repair service conditions, repair objectives, desired service 
life and future maintenance. 
The following are the most important repair material properties [22] along with 
the relationship of repair material (R) to concrete substrate (C) [23] listed in descending 
order:  
1. Drying Shrinkage   R<C     
2. Tensile Strength   R>C    
3. Modulus of Elasticity  R<C 
4. Tensile Strain Capacity  R>C 
5. Thermal Expansion/Contraction R<C  
6. Creep    R>C  
7. Compressive Strength  R=C 
Volume stability i.e., dry shrinkage, refers to the dimensional change of the repair 
material. The existing concrete, or substrate, is almost always stable and if the repair is 
not, high shear stresses occur at the interface that can lead to debonding, cracking and 
ultimately failure of the repair. Dry shrinkage is arguably the most important property for 
a durable repair. 
Another important property is the tensile strength. This is the maximum unit 
stress a repair material is capable of resisting under axial tension. 
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The modulus of elasticity is the ratio of normal stress to corresponding strain for 
tensile or compressive stress below the proportional limit of the material. If the repair is 
not structural, then it is preferable that the repair material has a lower modulus of 
elasticity than the substrate. However, if the repair is structural, then the repair material 
should have a modulus of elasticity as close as possible to the substrate’s property.  
The tensile strain capacity is the concrete’s resistance of cracking from slow rates 
of stress development under uniaxial tension. Investigation shows that the tensile strain 
capacity of concrete is a relatively independent parameter. [24]. 
The coefficient of thermal expansion is the change in linear dimension per unit 
length of a material per degree of temperature change. In situations where temperature is 
not controlled, such as in exterior and some interior applications, it is desirable for the 
repair material to have a coefficient of thermal expansion similar to that of the substrate 
concrete so that the two materials behave similarly under daily and seasonal temperature 
variations. If the coefficients vary significantly, the differential movements due to 
temperature fluctuations could affect the performance of the repair, and should be 
accounted for in the repair design. 
Creep is time-dependent deformation due to sustained load. Because many repairs 
are not subjected to significant compressive forces, compressive creep may not be a 
significant property of repair materials. Creep can be important if stress is induced in the 
repair material due to restraint of shrinkage strains or due to factors such as thermal 
movement or the application of live loads. 
Compressive strength is the measured maximum resistance of a material to axial 
compressive loading, expressed as force per unit cross-sectional area. This is the property 
42 
 
that most material manufacturers and distributers like to tout with high numbers. 
However, a high compressive strength does not mean anything if the repair patch is 
separating from its substrate concrete due to shrinkage. 
6.3 Repair Types 
 The DSMO uses seven fundamental repair methods used to address the 
deficiencies on precast deck panel bridges. Table 6.1 categorizes the repairs with their 
positive and negative aspects, indicating the stage of the deterioration model in which 
they are generally implemented along with an overall assessment on the effectiveness of 
the repairs.  
 
Table 6.1    Repair Methods 
Repair Types  Favorable 
Characteristics 
Unfavorable Characteristics Used at 
Stage of 
Deterioration 
model  
Effectiveness 
of Repair 
Crack Repair 
 
Helps keep out 
debris and 
impurities that may 
accelerate 
deterioration. 
Does not impede the 
deterioration process or help 
structurally. 
1,3 Not effective
Maintenance 
Spall 
Patching 
(Asphalt) 
Easy to place 
without much 
disruption to traffic. 
Very inexpensive 
repair. 
Only for temporary use If left 
longer than a week, could be 
detriment rather than a 
benefit to the bridge. 
4,6,9,11,12  Not effective
Localized 
Spall Repair 
Provides a repair 
with compressive 
strength in 
comparison to the 
maintenance 
patching with 
asphalt. 
Due to the nature of the deck 
panel system not acting 
compositely, the localized 
repairs start separating at the 
edges and new spalls 
described as “walking spalls”. 
4,6,9,11, 13  Not effective
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Table 6.1 (Continued) 
Grout 
Packing 
Good to slow down 
deterioration 
process by providing 
positive bearing and 
extending bridge 
life. No traffic 
impact. 
Does not mitigate deficiencies 
that were present prior to 
grout packing. 
2 thru 10  Good to slow 
down 
deterioration 
M1 Repair  Repair replaces 
deteriorated CIP 
component by 
extending to the top 
of the precast 
panel.  
Can separate from panel, start 
separating at the edges and 
new walking spalls start to 
appear. Process is moderately 
labor intensive and impacts 
traffic. 
7 Better than 
spall repair 
but not very 
effective 
Full Span M1 
Repair with 
Grout 
Packing 
Last longer than any 
other type aside 
from full depth bay 
replacement. 
Process is labor intensive and 
causes impacts to traffic. 
7 Effective
Full Depth 
Bay 
Replacement 
Addresses the root 
cause of problem: 
elimination of 
vertical and 
longitudinal 
separation between 
the precast deck 
panel and CIP 
surfaces.  
Costly, very labor intensive 
and causes significant impacts 
to the traveling public. 
8 thru 13  Very effective
 
A more detailed write up on the repairs presented in Table 6.1 is provided in 
Appendix B. 
Assessment of the prevailing repair procedures tabulated above indicates that 
crack repair, maintenance spall patching and localized spall repair are not effective 
because they do not mitigate the deterioration process caused by the panel and CIP 
sections not behaving compositely. Grout packing is a good method to slow down 
deterioration by providing positive bearing. However, if it is not applied at an early stage 
the deterioration that existed on the bridge will continue to intensify. Both M1 and M1 
with grout packing are acceptable repair procedures, but as seen in the deterioration 
model, these repairs eventually start to weaken because there is still a separation between 
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the precast panel and the cast in place section. Full depth bay replacement with CIP 
concrete is the most effective repair method because it addresses the root cause of the 
deterioration by eliminating the vertical and longitudinal interface between the precast 
deck panel and CIP concrete surfaces and provides positive bearing for the deck. 
Even though full depth bay replacement is the most effective repair, it is difficult 
to apply this method to high ADT highways due to the extended lane closures required to 
accommodate concrete curing time, as was the case on the emergency repair for Bridge 
No. 100436, I-75 over E. Broadway Ave. and CSX Railroad. Therefore, the deficiency 
was temporarily repaired and shored in September 2007 and a repair project was 
programmed to start construction in late 2009.   
The DSMO tasked Parsons Brinckerhoff (PB) to design a pilot project to replace 
the deficient bays on Bridge No. 100435 and 100436, twin bridges on I-75 that would 
minimize disruption to traffic. Traffic analysis and lane closure calculations indicated that 
this area of I-75 should only have nighttime lane closures due to high ADT conditions.  
Therefore the author, as PB’s design project manager, teamed with SDR Engineering, 
Inc. to design the partial deck replacement using full depth precast deck panels to achieve 
the DMSO’s goal [25].  The design detailed that the existing deteriorated deck be cut, 
demolished, removed and replaced with a full depth precast concrete deck only at 
night. This limitation required partial installation of sections of the full depth precast 
panel per night. It was specified that a minimum length of 30 ft. of full depth panel was to 
be installed per night. Near surface mounted (NSM) Carbon Polymer Reinforced Fiber 
(CFRP) bars were installed to transfer shear into the existing deck.  The construction was 
executed during the second quarter of 2010 and although similar technology has been 
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used in other states e.g., Issa [26], it was the first time that this method was applied in 
Florida.  It is also innovative being that this is the only method of full depth precast 
panels that transfers forces longitudinally employing the use of NSM CFRP bars, rather 
than transversely. For this reason the design for this pilot project was closely monitored 
and scrutinized by the DSMO as well as FDOT’s State Structures Design Office in 
Tallahassee. 
Key repair illustrations from the design plans are shown in Figure 6.1 and a more 
detailed description of the project is as follows.  
 
Figure 6.1    Full Depth Precast Panel Design Plan Details [25] 
The full depth 6,000 psi Class IV precast concrete panels were cast in a 
prestressing yard and brought on to the site nightly as needed for construction.   
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The existing composite precast and CIP deck was sawcut, from the inside face of 
beam to the inside face of beam with an additional six inches on both sides. A platform 
was constructed under the bay for containment and subsequent disposal of debris. An 
overhead crane was used for the removal of the cut out existing section (see Figure 6.2) 
as well as for the placement of the new full depth precast concrete panel section as shown 
in Figure. A "strong back" system was used to suspend the precast panel from designed 
pick-up points the top as shown in Figure 6.3. 
    
 
Figure 6.2    Existing Deck Cut and Removal Using Strong Back 
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Figure 6.3    New Deck Suspension Using Strong Back 
The process started by cleaning the edges of the top flanges of the beams with 
light sandblasting. After sandblasting, potable water was applied to surfaces of top 
flanges and vertical faces of existing deck slab to obtain a "saturated surface-dry" 
condition prior to grouting of the longitudinal joints. 
While the new panel is still suspended in place using the strong back, low 
pressure grout pumps were used to ensure full penetration of the epoxy grout below the 
edges of the panel to form proper seating as shown in Figure 6.4. The epoxy is kept in 
place between the top of beam and bottom of panel using backer rods, also shown in 
Figure 6.4. The epoxy was later placed on the panel and panel interface (i.e., transverse 
edges) of the previously installed full-depth panel section and the new section of panel to 
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be installed.  The new section of the full depth panel was pushed in place to form and seal 
the construction joint.   
 
Figure 6.4    Installing Backer Rod for Pouring Epoxy and Finished Epoxy Joint for 
Bonding New Panel with Existing as well as Seating for New Panel  
 
On the spans with AASHTO Type II Prestressed Concrete Beams, the shear 
connectors had to be cut and removed in order to fit the new precast panels into place and 
to ensure that the panels have proper bearing on the beams. Therefore, to transfer shear 
from the deck into the beams, adhesive bonded anchors were installed through preformed 
holes in the precast concrete panel slabs as shown in Figure 6.5.  Holes with specific 
diameters were drilled using a rotary hammer drill and bit into the beams for placement 
of the adhesive anchors.  It was specified to use a metal detector specifically designed for 
locating steel in concrete to avoid conflicts with the beams existing steel reinforcement. 
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Core drilling was performed to clear existing steel reinforcement. Next, the holes were 
cleaned using oil-free compressed air to remove loose particles accumulated from 
drilling.  
 
Figure 6.5    Adhesive Anchors 
The anchors were installed and adequate quantities of the adhesive bonding 
material were used to fill the drilled hole to approximately 1/4 inch of the concrete 
surface measured after placement of the steel bar or anchor.  
Grooves, approximately 3 ft. long were cut on both sides of the panel 
transversely, and extended 3 ft. into the existing deck. These were for the installation of 
the Near-Surface Mounted (NSM) CFRP Bars.  The use of CFRP bars are required for 
flexural strengthening in the negative moment regions of the bridge deck.   
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All grooves, where the NSM CFRP bars were to be placed were half-filled with 
embedding paste.  It was specified to avoid entrapped air voids between concrete 
substrate and the embedding paste.   
The CFRP bars were cut to the specified length, cleaned and placed into the half 
filled groove and slightly pressed to force the paste to flow around the bar, completely 
filling the space between the bar and the sides of the groove.  The groove was then filled 
with more paste until the surface leveled as shown in Figure 6.6. 
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Figure 6.6    Sawcutting Grooves into Deck and Placing CFRP Rods in Epoxy 
The CFRP system was allowed to cure then a protective coating was applied on 
the surface of the CFRP system.  
Limited planning and grooving of the new panel was required to match the finish 
and grade of the existing bridge deck.   
The pilot construction project was successful by resulting in a sound repair with 
no disruption to daytime traffic. Lane closures were performed only during night and 30 
lineal feet of the bay was replaced per night.  A total of 8,831 ft. of bay replacement was 
performed using full depth precast panels, 2,944 ft. on Bridge No. 100435 and 5,887 ft. 
on Br. No. 100436. Deck following project completion is shown in Figure 6.7. 
    
Figure 6.7    Completed Deck (Transverse and Longitudinal NSM CFRP 
Installation) 
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6.4 Summary and Conclusions 
Being that the remaining composite precast deck panel bridges will have to be 
addressed with rehabilitation in lieu of replacement, this chapter reviewed the 
effectiveness of seven repair methods. Currently the most effective method is full depth 
bay replacement with CIP concrete. If it is not possible to implement this method due to 
budget constraints, then grout packing should be used to replace the fiber board bearing 
material with non-shrink grout or epoxy provide to positive bearing to slow down the 
deterioration process. However, if conventional full depth bay replacement is not feasible 
due to traffic restrictions, then the favorable method of rehabilitation is the use of full 
depth precast panels. 
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7.   SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Precast deck panel bridges since the mid 1980s have been experiencing premature 
deterioration in Florida, which has been a great source of inconvenience to the FDOT in 
regards to time, money and impact to the traveling public. Five sudden deck failures 
occurred in Districts 1 and 7 between 2000 and 2003 as documented in Table 2.1. 
In 2005 USF completed a comprehensive study for the FDOT. The main goal of 
the study was identifying and prioritizing deck replacement of high risk bridges in 
Districts 1 and 7, primarily to prevent the occurrence of similar failures. However, since 
finalization of the study in 2005, two subsequent failures have taken place.   
The objectives of this research were to reassess the prioritizations of USF Study 
regarding the two subsequent failures, provide an update on the status of the composite 
precast deck panel bridges in Districts 1 and 7 and assess the effectiveness of repair 
methods used for this type of bridge deck system. 
The sudden failures took place on Bridge No. 100332, Crosstown Expressway 
Viaduct, Span 39 and Bridge No. 100436, I-75 over E. Broadway Ave., CR 574 and CSX 
Railroad. Both failures occurred in 2007 and were located in District 7 as shown in Table 
3.1. 
Bridge No. 100332 was ranked as the No. 1 priority for replacement on the 
Crosstown prioritization list as indicated in Table A.5.  First priority replacement ranking 
was given to this bridge because it Ranked No. 1 in the categories of Safety, Risk, 
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Normalized Risk, Importance, ADT, FDOT Ranking, Weighted Index, Failing Repair 
Count, and Spall Count.  
However, despite being assigned with highest priority for replacement on the 
Crosstown Expressway, the FDOT was unable to acquire the large amount of funding 
required for deck replacement in time to avoid the 2007 failure. Hence, the USF 
prioritization for replacement of Bridge No. 100332 was very accurate, and absolutely 
justified in being ranked No. 1. Had the FDOT been able to acquire the replacement 
funding for this bridge in time the failure might have been avoided. 
Bridge No. 100436 was ranked as No. 8 for replacement. The USF Study Team’s 
primary motive for not prioritizing this bridge higher for replacement at the time of the 
study was because it only had one failing repair. However, as exhibited by the monthly 
inspection reports, the repairs began deteriorating rapidly immediately after the study was 
finalized and continued until failure. 
Six of the seven bridges ranked for replacement ahead of this bridge had no 
failing repairs. The same six also had a lower Weighted Index. Six bridges ranked lesser in 
priority in FDOT Rank, Safety Rank, Normalized Risk, Safety Rank, Importance Rank 
and had and lower ADTs. This bridge also began showing signs of widespread transverse 
cracking since the early 2000s. Most of the transverse cracking pattern appears to be 
consistent with spacing of the precast panels. They are 1/8 in. width but three had grown 
to a ¾ in. width over time. 
Considering that ranking categories of Bridge No. 100436 were higher in priority 
than the six other bridges ranked ahead of it and discovering that this bridge had a 
prevalent problem with transverse cracking [20], it is determined that this bridge could 
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probably have been more accurately ranked at replacement priority No. 2, prior to the six 
other bridges. However, since Bridge No. 100436 was on the replacement prioritization 
list and ranked No. 8, approximately midway between the 15 bridges on that list, it is the 
author’s judgment that USF’s ranking was justifiable.  
In summary, the USF Study’s replacement rankings for the bridges that 
subsequently failed in 2007, Bridge Nos.  100332 and 100436 were well-founded.  
Since completion of the USF Study in 2005, a total of 51 composite precast deck 
panel bridges in Districts 1 and 7 have been replaced with full depth CIP decks.  The 
majority of the funding went to District 1, followed by District 7 and the Crosstown 
Expressway as indicated in the following breakdown: 
 District 1- bridges carrying or over I-75: 36 
 District 7- bridges carrying I-75: 9 
 Crosstown Expressway Bridges: 6 
Three additional bridges are in District 1’s work program to be replaced between 
now and 2020. However, due to the limited availability of funding and the current 
condition of the state’s economy, the remaining interstate and high ADT highway deck 
panel bridges will have to be addressed with rehabilitation until additional funding, if 
any, can be acquired for complete deck replacement. The remaining high ADT bridges 
are as follows: 
 District 1: 25 
 District 7: 27 
 Crosstown Expressway: 10 
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For this reason, research was performed on the repair methods used for precast 
deck panel bridge deficiencies to determine the effectiveness of each application. 
The repair method and materials play a big part in the performance and service 
life of the deck. Deck repairs are suitable when good concrete repair material and 
construction methods are applied. Where this is not carried out there is progressive 
degradation as indicated in the deterioration model shown in Figure 2.1, which can lead 
to punch through failure of the deck. This was the case in all seven failures where asphalt 
patching was used for repair. 
The effectiveness of seven repair methods was examined. Currently the most 
effective permanent repair for deck panel bridge deficiencies is full depth bay 
replacement. If full depth replacement is not possible due to traffic or budget constraints, 
then grout packing should be used to replace the fiber board bearing material with non-
shrink grout or epoxy to provide positive bearing in order to slow down the deterioration 
process until the full depth bay replacement or entire span replacement can be 
accomplished. The conventional full depth bay replacement is not always feasible due to 
restrictions such as not being able to close down lanes on high ADT highways. In this 
case it was found that the favorable method of construction for bay replacement was the 
use of full depth precast panels. The DSMO performed a pilot construction project 
employing this method on Bridge No. 100435 and 100436 earlier in the year. Lane 
closures were performed only during night and 30 lineal feet of the bay was replaced per 
night. The project ended successfully by providing a sound repair, consisting of 8831 ft. 
of bay replacement using full depth precast panels. This was done without disrupting any 
daytime traffic.   
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APPENDIX A: USF STUDY’S PRIORITIZATION TABLES 
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APPENDIX A (Continued) 
Table A.1    Recommended District 1 Bridge Replacement Sequence 
No. Bridge No. Location 
1 130090 I-275 NB Over I-75 
2 130112 I-275 SB R to I-75 NB & 
 I-75 And I-275 Ramps 
3 170081 I-75 Over Palmer Blvd 
4 170080 I-75 Over Main  A  Canal 
5 030188 I-75 over CR-846 
6 170094 I-75 NB Over Havana Road 
7 170099 SR-681 SB Over CSX RR 
8 170089 I-75 Over River Road/Cr 777 
9 170100 SR-681 NB Over CSX RR 
10 010064 Oil Well Road Over I-75 
11 030187 I-75 Over CR-846 
12 170096 I-75 SB Over Jacaranda Blvd 
13 170079 I-75 Over Main A Canal 
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APPENDIX A (Continued) 
Table A.2    District 1 Bridges in Good Condition 
No. Bridge No. Location 
1 10059 I-75 Over CR-776 
2 10065 Airport Rd Over I-75 
3 10066 CR-768 Over I-75 
4 10067 US-17 Over Florida St. 
5 10068 US-17 Over Florida St. 
6 10075 Carmalite St. Over I-75 
7 10090 US-17 Over Lavilla St. & Rr 
8 10091 US-17 Over Lavilla St. & Rr 
9 120085 US-41 Over Imperial River 
10 120086 US-41 Over Imperial River 
11 120088 SR-685 Over Matanzas Pass 
12 120114 Slater Rd. Over I-75 
13 120126 I-75 NB Over Alico Rd./Canal 
14 120127 I-75 SB Over Alico Rd./Canal 
15 130085 I-75 NB Over SR-64 
16 130089 Erie Rd Over I-75 
17 130107 Mendoza Rd Over I-75 
18 170082 I-75 Over Palmer Blvd. 
19 170083 I-75 SB Over SR-780 
20 170084 I-75 NB Over SR-780 
21 170090 I-75 Over River Rd. 
22 170091 I-75 SB Over Jackson Rd. 
23 170092 I-75 NB Over Jackson Rd. 
24 170093 I-75 Over SR-80 
25 170095 I-75 NB Over Jacaranda Blvd. 
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APPENDIX A (Continued) 
Table A.3    Recommended District 7 Bridge Replacement Sequence 
No. Bridge No. Location 
1 100468 I-75 SB Over Woodberry Rd. 
2 100347 I-75 NB Over SR-674 
3 100470 I-75 SB Over CSX RR 
4 100358 I-75 SB Over Alafia River 
5 100359 I-75 NB Over Alafia River 
6 150122 I-275 NB Over 5th Ave. North 
7 100346 I-75 SB Over SR-674 
8 100436 
I-75 NB Over Broadway/CR-574 / 
CSX RR 
9 100338 US-41 Over Mackay Bay 
10 100357 I-75 NB Over Riverview Drive 
11 100356 I-75 SB Over Riverview Drive 
12 100080 SR 60 WB Over Bypass Canal 
13 100081 SR 60 EB Over Bypass Canal 
14 100049 US-41Over Palm River 
15 100351 Valroy Road Over I-75 
 
Table A.4    District 7 Bridges in Good Condition 
No. Bridge No. Location 
1 100398  I-75 NB Over Sligh Ave./Ramp D-1 
2 100339  US 301 Over Tampa Bypass Canal 
3 100377  Gibsonton Dr. Over I-75 
4 100399 SR 582 WB Over Bypass Canal 
5 100424  Ramp B Over US 92 
6 100435  I-75 SB Over Broadway/CR574/CSX  
7 100469  I-75 NB Over Woodberry Rd. 
8 100471  I-75 Over CSX RR 
9 150121 I-275 SB Over 5th Ave 
10 150145  I-375 WB Over CR-689 
11 150146  I-375 EB Over CR-689 
12 150168  I-175 WB Over 6th St. S 
13 150169  I-175 EB Over 6th St. S 
14 150170  8th St. S Over I-175 
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APPENDIX A (Continued) 
Table A.5    Recommended Crosstown Expressway Replacement Sequence 
 
  
No. Bridge No. Location 
1 100332 
SR 618 WB Over  Hills River/ Downtown 
TPA 
2 100333 
SR 618 EB Over  Hills River/ Downtown 
TPA 
3 100443 
SR618 Over  Ramp D & SR585/22nd Street 
& R/R 
4 100453 SR 618  Over 50th Street (US 41) 
5 100448 SR 618 Over CSX  RR 
6 100451 SR 618 Over 39th Street 
7 100447 SR 618  Over RR 
8 100457 SR 618  Over Maydell Drive 
9 100449 SR 618 Over 34th Street & Creek 
10 100454 SR 618 Over 50th Street (US 41) 
11 100456 SR 618 Over CSX R/R 
12 100444 SR 618 Over SR 585 22nd St/CSX RR 
13 100455 SR 618 Over CSX RR 
14 100450 SR 618 Over 34th Street & Creek 
15 100452 SR 618 Over 39th Street 
16 100446 SR 618 Over 26th Street 
17 100458 SR 618 Over Maydell Drive 
18 100445 SR 618 Over 26th Street 
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APPENDIX B: REPAIR METHODS 
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APPENDIX B (Continued) 
B.1 Crack Repair     
The USF study reported that at the second stage of the deterioration model is the 
occurrence of longitudinal cracks over the edges of the girders. This type of cracking 
starts early in precast deck panel bridges and is the most common type of cracking. This 
crack is mainly the result of creep induced by prestressing forces in the precast panel, and 
the differential shrinkage between the CIP concrete and the deck precast panel. Once the 
formation of longitudinal cracking has started, sporadic transverse cracks can also 
develop in the deck.  
The cracking can be repaired with epoxy crack injection or crack sealant. Crack 
injection is a structural repair meaning that it ideally restores the structural strength of the 
deck to original. Crack sealing penetrates and covers the cracking in order to avoid water, 
chlorides and other impurities from entering inside the deck [B.1]. If it is determined that 
the crack is active, (i.e., opening and closing), then epoxy crack injection should not be 
used because it does not have the flexibility like crack sealant.  
The transverse cracks on Bridge No. 100436 were sealed using a flexible sealant 
following the first failure on September 11, 2007.   
B.2 Maintenance Spall Patching      
After the occurrence of the second parallel crack, the concrete trapped between 
the two cracks is already internally cracked and starts to crumble. During the fourth stage 
of the deterioration model, a spall develops.  At this stage, a new parameter is introduced, 
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APPENDIX B (Continued) 
the effect of the rainwater forced inside the cracks by vehicles. Although this is difficult 
to quantify, bridge inspectors have observed this phenomenon over the years.  
FDOT classifies deck patching in three different categories based upon depth 
[B.2]: 
 Type A- Above the top layer of reinforcing steel 
 Type B- At least one inch below the top layer of reinforcing 
 Type C- Full depth replacement 
The most common and simplest repair method is maintenance spall patching. It is 
used for spalls that are in the CIP portion of the deck. When a deficiency such as a spall 
would appear on the bridge deck (approximately ten years after construction as indicated 
in the simplified deck deterioration process depicted in Figure 2.1), it was common 
practice for the FDOT maintenance crews to patch it with flexible (i.e., “cold patch”) 
asphaltic concrete as illustrated in Figure B.1. 
 
Figure B.1    Bridge No. 100332, Span 38- Asphalt Patch (2 Days Before Failure) 
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APPENDIX B (Continued) 
The asphaltic concrete patching is not labor intensive for the crews and can be 
performed in a matter of minutes with very minimal disruption to the traveling public. It 
is also a very inexpensive procedure. The maintenance crews would set up a temporary 
lane closure(s) as needed, clean debris out of the spall using hand tools and patch it using 
a ready mix bag. The purpose of asphalt patching was to alleviate immediate danger to 
the motoring public as well as to avoid the spall from getting worse. This method of 
repair was never meant as a permanent solution, and although it was always the DSMO’s 
policy for the maintenance crew to return within a week and perform a permanent repair, 
sometimes due to other priorities of the crews, these temporary patches would remain for 
a longer periods of time [B.3]. This type of patch for extended periods of time has proved 
to be a detriment rather than a benefit to the bridge. This is especially the case when 
asphalt is used in steps 11 and 12 of the deterioration model, (i.e., when used to patch 
spalls inside or adjacent to a deficient M1 Repair). Instead of distributing the load evenly, 
when the flexible material, which has negligible compressive strength, was placed in the 
spall it would pound at the precast panel beneath it and the adjacent CIP section at its 
sides. In most cases this type of pounding action leads to an increase in the area and depth 
of the spalls and in some cases has led to cracking of the precast panel due to punching 
shear. In the absolute worst case scenarios, asphalt was used to repair existing repairs in 
the deck and the pounding resulted in punching a hole through the deck as shown in 
Figure B.2. In most of the punch through failures, rainy weather had been a catalyst. 
Water manages to find its way into the patched spall. Water is an incompressible fluid, 
even  more so than the  incompressible  properties of  asphalt.    The wheel loading on the  
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APPENDIX B (Continued) 
patch causes pumping action between the asphalt and the precast panel until failure. 
Although there is no solid proof, it is strongly believed that this is a major cause of punch 
through failure in the deck. Six of the seven failures in Tables 1 and 5 occurred after 
rainfall. 
 
Figure B.2    Bridge No. 100332, Span 38- Asphalt Patch (Failure) 
Additionally, as indicated in Tables 2.1 and 3.1, six out of the seven failures had 
asphalt repairs. Four were standalone asphalt patches and two were asphalt patches used 
to address deficiencies within existing repairs. 
B.3 Localized Spall Repair 
 Unlike the maintenance spall patch, localized spall repairs are theoretically a 
permanent type of repair. It is classified by FDOT as Type B or C. This repair method is 
the immediate follow-up step to the maintenance spall patch for the maintenance crews. It 
is mainly used for deficiencies that lie within the depth of the CIP portion of the deck, but 
they have also been used for  full depth repair.   These repairs are performed using a con- 
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APPENDIX B (Continued) 
crete repair material. This repair method is not so labor intensive, can be done at a 
relatively low cost, and when using high strength fast setting material, it can be 
performed using nighttime lane closures, reducing major impacts on the traveling public.  
Since bridge deck repair usually involves closing lane(s), the material most often 
used is some type of rapid-setting concrete repair material. Most brands of this material 
usually attain 4000 psi in 4 hours. 
Although this is a permanent repair, the FDOT has not had much success with the 
longevity of these repairs. Due to the nature of the deck panel system not acting 
compositely, the localized repairs start separating at the edges and new spalls described 
as “walking spalls” start appearing in front of these repairs (see Figure B.3). 
 
 
 
  
Figure B.3    Patched Spalls and Walking Spalls 
Depending on all the associated factors, new spalls can appear in the areas 
adjacent to the repaired spall after some time. After the spall is created, the residual shear 
capacity of that region is almost zero, even after it has been patched. Therefore, the shear 
that was to be supported by that region now has to be redistributed to sections adjacent to  
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the spall. This creates additional stresses in that region, and accelerates its deterioration 
generating new spalls, which are also generally treated with flexible repair material (see 
Figure B.4). 
                            
Figure B.4    Localized Spall Repair Starting to Spall at the Edge  
One of the seven failures reported in Tables 2.1 and 3.1 occurred at an area which 
had been repaired by localized full depth spall patching. 
B.4 Grout Packing 
The majority of deck panel bridges in Florida have been built with fiberboard 
bearing material or what is commonly referred to as “roofing felt” to support the precast 
deck panels on the girders. By use of this Fiberboard bearing material, positive bearing is 
not provided at the ends of the precast panel. Due to the effects of creep and shrinkage, 
the initial separation and longitudinal crack indicated in Deterioration Stage No. 2 is 
inherent to precast deck panel construction. However, the few bridges in Florida that had 
used positive bearing have performed much better and in turn have had longer service 
lives.  The most important conclusion drawn from the forensic study in the 2005 USF re- 
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port is that the lack of positive panel bearing is clearly the main factor responsible for the 
occurrence of major deck deterioration such as cracking, delamination, spalling, failing 
repairs, and in the worst case localized punch-through deck failures. Hence, grout 
packing is a good method of repair. The fiber board bearing material is replaced with 
non-shrink Portland cement grout or epoxy grout to provide positive bearing, (see Figure 
B.5). 
 
Figure B.5    Bearing Detail after Grout Packing Repair 
Grout packing is one of the most effective repair methods used to extend the 
service lives of precast deck panel bridges. It is very cost effective in comparison to other 
effective repair methods and it does not cause any interruption in traffic to the facility 
carried by the structure because the work can be performed utilizing a bucket truck or 
scissor lift underneath the bridge. 
It is important to note that none of the failures reported in Tables 2.1and 3.1 were 
retrofitted with grout packing.   
 
   
Replace Fiber Board w/ Grout Replace Fiber Board w/ Grout
PanelPanel
Deck Top 
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B.5 M1 Repair  
Generally, after several patch and re-patches, an M1 repair is done in the affected 
area. The M1 repair is used to repair longitudinal spalling along the edge of a beam as 
illustrated in Figure B.6. The M1 and M2 were FDOT’s recommended methods of repair 
in the 1980s [B.4]. 
 
Figure B.6    M1 Repair Procedure (Stage #7) 
Unlike localized repairs, the depth of the M1 goes to the top of the precast panel. 
Although the M1 repairs hold up better than localized repairs, again due to the bridge 
deck system not acting compositely, they start separating at the edges and walking spalls 
start occurring in front of these repairs.    
Two of the seven failures in Tables 2.1 and 3.1 were associated with deteriorating 
M1 repairs. On Bridge No. 170085 there was a walking spall, patched with asphalt adja- 
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cent to an M1 repair and on Bridge 100332, Span 70, asphalt was used to patch a 
deficiency within an existing M1 repair. 
B.6 Full Span M1 Repair with Grout Packing 
This somewhat modified M1 repair is also used to repair longitudinal spalling 
along the edge of a beam. The difference with this repair is that the CIP concrete portion 
on top of the precast beams, as well as on top of the beams, is fully removed and 
additional steel is added to the area on top of the beams. The fiber board bearing material 
is replaced with non-shrink Portland cement grout or epoxy as discussed previously to 
provide positive bearing. This repair is extended longitudinally throughout the length of 
the span. 
The durability of the modified M1 repair and the condition of the deck area 
around it depends on the following parameters:  
1. Time period between spall, spall repair, and M1 repair,  
2. Possible internal damage to the panel induced from previous stages,  
3. Possible internal damage to the panel induced from removal of CIP concrete,  
4. Bonding between the old concrete and the repair material,  
5. Stress redistribution to adjacent areas (after removal of the damaged CIP 
concrete that deck region is no longer transferring shear to the supports, so 
that shear is redistributed to the transverse edges of the repair),  
6. Repair material,  
7. Presence of panel shear connectors embedded in the M1 repair,  
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8. Time interval between repair and passage of traffic.  
9. And finally the most important parameter, removal of the fiberboard and its 
replacement by non shrink epoxy. 
This procedure is labor intensive, costly and causes interruption to traffic. 
However, with the exception of full bridge bay replacement, it is the most effective repair 
method because it fills the spalled area under the wheel lines with sound incompressible 
material and provides positive bearing for the deck panels.  Nevertheless, even these 
repairs can end up with deficiencies such as longitudinal cracks within them or adjacent 
to them. 
None of the failures reported in Tables 2.1 and 3.1 had M1 and grout packing as 
the method of repair. 
B.7 M2 Repair 
Although the M2 repair method was not encountered in any of the authors 
inspections or failures listed in Tables 2.1 and 3.1, it deserves to be mentioned because it 
was prescribed as a good method of repair by the FDOT in the 1980s [B.3]. The M2 
repair, shown in Figure B.7, is used to fix the problem of cracking and spalling along the 
transverse joints of the precast panel.  The unsound material is removed approximately 
six inches on each side of the transverse joint and an inverted T-beam is formed with the 
bottom of the precast panel sitting on the flange of the inverted T-beam. The flange of the 
T-beam is required to be at least 24 inches wide. The inverted T-beam needs to be 
provided with positive bearing on the girders [B.3]. 
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Figure B.7    M2 Repair Procedure [3] 
The M2 repairs are costly relative to other repair methods and cause impact to the 
traveling public. 
B.8 Full Depth Bay Replacement 
Full depth bay replacement is the most effective repair method for deficient 
precast deck panel bridges. In fact it is the directive of the DSMO to use this method for 
all permanent repairs. At a minimum, it is done in a bay (the transverse distance between 
two beams) and throughout the length of the span. Sometimes the entire deck on the span 
or all bays is replaced with full depth CIP concrete. 
When only a bay is replaced, the CIP concrete and precast panel is demolished, 
leaving only the reinforcing steel grid which was within the CIP section for continuity, 
then removed using jack hammers. A new bottom steel mat is designed as shown in 
Figure B.8 [B.5] and placed as an alternate to the precast panel.  
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Figure B.8    Full Depth Bay Replacement Detail 
A standard compression test is performed on 6 in. x 12 in. test cylinders at 24 
hours, 48 hours, and 72 hours after the concrete is poured and finished. Although there is 
always pressure from the public and elected officials, the bridge is not opened to traffic 
until the minimum required compressive strength per design calculations is attained. 
After the concrete has gained the required strength, the bridge or repaired area is opened 
to traffic. 
The conventional bay replacement is the most expensive repair method and 
causes significant interruption to the traveling public. However, it is the most effective 
repair method because it addresses the root cause of the problem which is the elimination 
of the vertical and longitudinal separation between the precast deck panel and CIP 
surfaces. None of the failures reported in Tables 2.1 and 3.1 occurred on decks which had 
been repaired by full depth bay replacement. 
It is difficult to apply this method to high ADT highways due to the extended lane 
closures required to accommodate concrete curing time. This was the case on Bridge No.  
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100436, I-75 over E. Broadway Ave. and CSX Railroad. It is the last recorded failure as 
shown in Table 3.1. This was temporarily repaired and shored in September 2007.  
Traffic analysis and lane closure calculations indicate that the I-75 in this area can only 
have nighttime lane closures due to high ADT conditions.  
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